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SO:  This is Dr Sue Onslow talking to Mr Joe Clark, former Prime Minister 
and Secretary for External Affairs of Canada, in London on Tuesday, 
23rd April 2013. Mr Clark, thank you very much for agreeing to talk to me. 
I wonder if you could begin by saying how did you see the 
Commonwealth at the beginning of your political career? 
 
JC:  The first acquaintance I remember with the Commonwealth was by way of 
Commonwealth Scholarships at the University of Alberta in 1958-59. I came 
from a very Anglo-Saxon part of my home province of Alberta. I had never 
met a black person, to my knowledge, until I ran into some Nigerians who 
were Commonwealth Scholarship students. At that time, a number of 
Commonwealth Scholarship students came to Canada. My consciousness of 
what I considered a “British connection” came earlier. My home is in the ranch 
country of High River and about 22 miles west of us was the Edward Prince of 
Wales ranch – the “EP Ranch” - that was the western retreat of the [former 
Prince Edward VIII].  As a 3 year old, we and other families were invited to 
visit the ranch to meet the Duke of Windsor. I was wearing short pants and 
we walked through fields of stubble. I have pictures of my bleeding legs. 
 
SO:  Ouch! 
 
JC:  So we had those connections that I think disposed me to a sense of the realm 
and, by inference, the Commonwealth. Many of those ranches had been 
started in the late 1800s by so-called “remittance men” from the UK who, I 
later learned, retained close connections with their British families. It’s 
germane to note that this British connection was a more dominant part of the 
Canadian experience, generally, when I was growing up than what it became 
later, as the Canadian population grew significantly more multicultural. British 
practices established a lot of the framework of the wider world for my part of 
Alberta because the families of these “remittance men” continued and 
conveyed their sense of standards and culture. I will never forget a couple 
who, in their early 30s, had bought a very good ranch, but he became 
severely arthritic and was able only to manage the books and planning, so his 
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wife did the farm work, the ranch work. And that was hard work. But every 
second Friday she had a full dress formal dinner in her house at the ranch. 
What was interesting was not just that she did it, but that there were enough 
of the Brits in the neighbourhood that she always found guests who knew 
what to wear, what fork to use – all of these civilized European customs, out 
literally in the wilds. So that’s where I grew up, and we had a sense, 
consequently, of a British – if not a Commonwealth – connection. 
 
SO: But the Commonwealth you’re describing – that you knew as a child, 
that sense of a wider British world – was a different British 
Commonwealth to the Commonwealth post-1949. 
 
JC:  I’m really speaking about the connection with British practices and institutions 
which were, of course, an elemental, essential connection with the 
Commonwealth. My perception broadened at university where I met students 
from the wider Commonwealth. But I expect that, in many Commonwealth 
countries in the 1940s and 50s, that sense of a British connection pre-dated 
and led to a sense of a Commonwealth connection. Recall that the instinct to 
act more independently but remain a part of the British “family” and 
institutions took root in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, where 
Canadians and other Empire soldiers fought valiantly and were widely ignored 
by the British on critical issues when it came to fashioning a peace. A 
combination of pressures began independently with each of South Africa, 
Australia and Canada that coalesced to constitute a relation that was no 
longer the old Empire but in effect an early Commonwealth. Canadians 
regard that experience as being the beginning of our independence as a 
country. I understand that my encounters growing up in mid-century Canada 
are British more than Commonwealth, but they indicated a perceived 
community at that time that was both British and determined to be 
independent within a British framework. 
 
SO:  As you say, there was the white, wider British world of the Dominions, 
leading up to the acquisition of full independence. But by the 1960s and 
your university career, the Commonwealth had itself altered with the 
emergence of the Afro-Asian bloc – following the great wave of African 
independence in the 1960s, and the creation of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. You mentioned that your personal experience and 
engagement with Nigerian students altered your perception of the role 
and the importance of the Commonwealth in a wider, international 
community. When you came into politics, did you see the 
Commonwealth as being a viable, attractive, valuable entity in any way? 
 
JC:  I did for a very particular reason. I had been elected as the National President 
of the Progressive Conservative Student Federation before I became a 
candidate for any public office. Our party leader, Mr Diefenbaker, as Prime 
Minister, had played a critical role in the 1960 CHOGM and I still recall his 
reference to leaving a light in the window for South Africa after apartheid was 
gone. Several of us were young students then; Brian Mulroney was another. I 
remember standing in the lobby of the Chateau Laurier hotel in Ottawa when 
Mr Diefenbaker came back from that CHOGM to an annual meeting of our 
party. We knew from where he was coming, and the role he had played in 
that London meeting. Years later, in the late 1990s, I was asked why was it 
that Mr Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government elected in 1984 had 
taken a more active role in the Commonwealth, particularly on the apartheid 
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question, than the Trudeau government had before. It was because we 
regarded the apartheid issue – and the Commonwealth as an instrument of 
dealing with the apartheid issue – as being very much a part of the 
Progressive Conservative tradition in government. So, both Mr Mulroney and 
I, and many of our colleagues and supporters, had been won to that 
Commonwealth cause before either of us became elected to the House of 
Commons. 
 
Other than that, there was not much broad public consciousness of the 
Commonwealth as an active international force. We’re speaking of public 
perceptions – not objective importance, not even the priorities of a 
government. My recollection is that, even among organizations which 
promoted or supported the Commonwealth in Canada, in the 1960s and early 
‘70s the sense of connection was more British than Commonwealth. Our 
domestic population was diversifying rapidly then, with, among other things, a 
large and growing Indo-Canadian population, but I don’t recall thinking of 
them in Commonwealth terms. The exception may be Canadians from the 
Caribbean. 
 
SO:  Just to step forwards to the 1970s: I know that when Pierre Trudeau 
became Prime Minister – and he was a very youthful Prime Minister – 
his references to the Commonwealth at the start of his premiership were 
very much, ‘We have no need of this nostalgic organisation. Canada is a 
young and dynamic country; it is progressive and forward-looking and 
the Commonwealth is an out-dated institution’. Does that correspond 
very much with your own recollection? 
 
JC:  Here is the likely context in which that was said. Mr Trudeau became Prime 
Minister following Mr [Lester B] Pearson – the Nobel Prize-winning 
internationalist who was the embodiment of Canadian foreign policy, but 
whom Trudeau, as a commentator then, had once called the ‘de-frocked 
Prince of Peace’. 
 
SO: [Laughs] 
 
JC: To Pearson’s great credit, he invited Trudeau to become a candidate for 
election to Parliament and then named him to the highly-public and 
prestigious portfolio of Minister of Justice; [this] opened the way to his running 
for the Liberal party leadership and becoming Prime Minister. Now…how do I 
say this? Mr Trudeau came to office with a personal mission that had largely 
to do with Quebec and Quebec’s place in the country. He was also a very 
well-informed and well-travelled person, but there were large areas of public 
policy where his instincts were stronger than his knowledge. Economic policy 
could generally be regarded as one of those. I expect that his actual 
experience with the Commonwealth as Commonwealth would also fall into 
that latter category. He had visited Commonwealth countries because he 
visited broadly, but I expect he visited them as interesting societies 
themselves, rather than as part of a Commonwealth with Canada. And he 
was inclined, in that early incarnation, to dismiss a lot of Canadian foreign 
policy – call it ‘Pearson-ian’ foreign policy – as either nostalgic or needing 
serious review. 
 
One of his great friends and close collaborators was the late Ivan Head, with 
a similar intellectual background but a deeper formal immersion in the detail 
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and practice of international affairs. Ivan and I were from the same province, 
Alberta, and had mutual friends, but were not particularly close. Ivan had 
been a Foreign Service officer, and the Foreign Service is often hard on its 
bright, younger officers. Often, they have to stay in the service a longish while 
before they find their talents appreciated. Ivan left early, as I recall, thinking 
that a lot of Canadian foreign policy was not modern. So the precise citations 
you’re quoting sound to me as though they would not have been 
Commonwealth-specific but part of a generic view that Mr Trudeau espoused 
at the beginning, concerning established Canadian foreign policy generally.  
 
SO:  I know that Ivan Head was one of the key drafters of the Singapore 
Declaration in 1971, and that by 1973, at the Ottawa CHOGM, it was 
Trudeau’s innovation to bring in the Retreat at Heads of Government 
Meetings. So he became a passionate advocate of high level 
Commonwealth summitry and its efficacy. 
 
JC:  Mr Trudeau also became an architect of Canada’s participation in the North-
South dialogue, and I believe that the presence in the Commonwealth family 
of many of the major and different voices in the North-South dialogue was an 
inescapable and instructive dynamic in the Commonwealth, as it was in the 
‘70s and ‘80s, and now. That disposed people who might not otherwise have 
thought of that kind of engagement to do so. [What] I’m saying is that the 
quotation about nostalgia was probably part of a ‘state of mind’ of Mr Trudeau 
when he came to office, but that changed on some questions as he settled in. 
Was the Commonwealth front and centre in Canadian policy in 1967 kind of 
planning then? I don’t think so, particularly. A separate question is whether 
there has been, in Canadian foreign policy, a view of the Commonwealth as 
an institution with real potential? Yes, I think that was the case, but in terms of 
tangible priorities and consequences probably more in my party than in Mr 
Trudeau’s. 
 
SO: I'm interested in this dynamic of interaction between Canada and the 
Commonwealth over international issues. The Secretary General, of 
course, was himself a former Canadian leading diplomat. Arnold Smith, 
as Secretary General, was one of the key advocates of Bangladesh 
becoming independent in 1971, which was born out of the crisis of the 
Pakistan civil war. The Commonwealth was, of course, enormously 
challenged over issues of how to manage Pakistan’s departure from the 
Commonwealth, [as well as] British sales of arms to South Africa, 
questions of development, media taunts – was it, indeed, ‘a jelly fish 
without a sting?' These debates are very much within the newspapers of 
the late 1960s and 1970s. There was the enormous bust-up before the 
Singapore conference, yet it seems there is a certain cycle of friction 
and resolution within the Commonwealth. But was it seen as a viable 
international institution? Did it all depend on the issues and vision of 
the Secretary General? Certainly Arnold Smith was an enormously 
efficacious Secretary General and had a clear vision of the scope and 
framework of what he should pursue: his papers make that very clear in 
the library and archives. 
 
JC:  In my view, Canada had an unusual rise to adulthood in international affairs. 
A group of highly intelligent people had been recruited to the Foreign Service 
under Prime Minister Mackenzie King, and they became the core of a small, 
smart foreign service. But they were held on a very tight leash in the late 
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1930s and early 1940s because King, himself, was pre-occupied with existing 
internal divisions within Canada, and did not want foreign involvements to 
introduce new potential sources of conflict. In that sense, he was the opposite 
of an internationalist. He had very strong emotional loyalty to Britain and was 
naturally apprehensive about the inevitable impact upon Canada of the United 
States. 
 
A critical turning point in Canadian attitude towards international involvement 
and institutions came when Prime Minster King named Louis St Laurent as 
his foreign minister. King took that action, typically, for domestic reasons – 
because, on some of the divisive debates in Canada about conscription, 
about participation in the Second World War, St Laurent had been a key 
francophone minister who had been forthright in defending Canada’s 
involvement in the war to Quebec critics and so was known and viewed by 
King as a very talented and valuable ally. In fact, King was probably grooming 
him to become Prime Minister. This is all to the side, except that when St 
Laurent became foreign minister – which I suspect King regarded as a place 
to put him until better things came along – …  
 
SO:  [Laughs] 
 
JC:  …he found an immediate identification with these bright, young foreign 
service officers who had been framed not only by their own intellectual 
strength but had been abroad in war. Canada had opened a series of 
embassies in wartime because we had lives and interests on the line in the 
war and needed to be present where our allies were. So, these talented 
foreign service officers were sent abroad to open and operate embassies and 
came back to Ottawa with real experience and understanding of – and 
personal contacts in – a changing world. There is another very important 
aspect of this, which has more to do with Britain, maybe the Commonwealth, 
by extension. A lot of talented young Canadians who went away to school in 
the 1920s and 1930s came to the UK, so all sorts of personal bonds were 
formed – not just with Brits but with others who had been drawn to Britain as 
well. Many of those Canadian students came home to join the Foreign 
Service, and often brought with them a view that was more internationalist. In 
fact, the issue which symbolized a basic change in Canadian foreign policy 
was not a Commonwealth issue, but reflected the new force of thinking more 
internationally and less parochially. That issue was Korea, where King wanted 
to stay out because he didn’t want entanglements. St Laurent – more modern 
by instinct but buttressed by the perspective and argument of his officials – 
insisted that Canada had an obligation to support a United Nations initiative, 
and threatened to resign if Canada did not become engaged in UN 
commitments respecting Korea. From that point forward, with the Second 
World War ended, Canada adopted a more internationalist position in the 
world. 
 
SO: Are you referring to a separate political culture existing within DFA, 
towards the Commonwealth, that then runs parallel with a multilateral or 
Atlanticist/NATO worldview which accepted being part of a wider 
American world? 
 
JC:  Not so much a separate culture, but a changing culture precipitated by the 
need for reconstruction and a new international architecture after the Second 
War, and by Canada’s unaccustomed relative prominence – both on the 
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battlefield during that war, and in the innovations and institution-building that 
followed. Not only had Canadians been gallant and prominent in that conflict, 
we emerged from that war as an intact and growing economy and country in a 
time when many of our allies and friends were rebuilding from physical 
destruction. The evolution of the Commonwealth from the old Empire was a 
feature of that change, and the appointment of an able Canadian as the first 
Secretary General was a symbol of a new era – both in international relations, 
generally, and in the role of Canada and Canadians. In Canada, at least, that 
transformation into a more activist and influential role occurred across a range 
of international issues and institutions. The first chair of the contracting parties 
of what became the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a 
Canadian trade commissioner and diplomat from Vancouver, Dana Wilgress. 
Mr Pearson was obviously very active, not least in the resolution of the Suez 
Crisis and the creation – along with Canadian General E. L. M. Burns – of 
United Nations peacekeeping. The McGill professor John Humphrey was a 
principal author of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, 
Mr St. Laurent played a leading role in drafting the London Declaration, 
defining the Commonwealth. Mr Pearson was one of the “three wise men” 
whose recommendations shaped the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). And so, suddenly, from a position where Canadians were very 
careful about not venturing into most of the world, we became prominent and 
influential in the front lines of multilateralism.   
 
SO:  This seems to be a particularly Canadian version of multilateralism, yes. 
 
JC:  That flows from our particular composition as an explicitly bilingual country, 
shaped increasingly by a respect for multiple cultures. I argue in my book 
‘How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change’ that Canada “came to 
maturity in a multilateral time, at the end of the Second World War, when the 
costs of conflict were everywhere on display….” A narrow definition of 
‘national interest’ may have applied in an age when most international 
relations were adversarial or occasional, and international decisions were 
dominated by a handful of powers, but that concept….has not, in fact, ever fit 
Canada’s experience….To an unusual degree, we have served and asserted 
our national interests by reinforcing the instruments and effectiveness of the 
international community. There has been an inherent desire to make 
multilateralism work and to focus on multilateralism which has also 
immediately served Canada’s interest – as trade did, or security, or 
international development, or where we could have a shaping role as in the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Sir, did you see the Commonwealth as an alternative to international, 
communal organisation through the United Nations?   
 
JC:  No, because historically we pursued both together. I see the Commonwealth 
emphasis rather as building upon political and cultural traditions, and 
enlarging upon experiences which we knew worked. One of the reasons that 
the Mulroney government was much more active in encouraging Canadian 
membership in La Francophonie was because of our positive experience of 
fruitful co-operation among developed and developing countries in the 
Commonwealth. We had other reasons of course – a strong interest in 
reflecting our francophone as well as our anglophone heritage and roots. The 
preceding Trudeau government would not take any action which might 
enlarge the international status of Quebec. We found a formula which allowed 
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those provinces where either a majority or significant minority of citizens 
spoke French as a first language to have status in La Francophonie. Had our 
experience of the Commonwealth been negative, we would not have 
embraced La Francophonie as vigorously as we did. In fact, France did not 
much want us because we would challenge and dilute their dominant 
authority. Our simple membership, our relative wealth and sophistication, 
changed the balance within La Francophonie. (I informed them of my work 
with the CFM; but there is no indication that anything was done with this 
information. Incidentally, the group had almost faded into obscurity in the 
1970s but resumed heads of Government meetings in the 1980s. This 
suggests that there was never any shared authority among La Francophonie 
members.) In a comparable way, Mr Mulroney’s and my active personal 
engagement – and Mrs Thatcher’s reluctance to have Britain chair the 
Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa 
(CCFMSA) – changed the traditional leadership of the Commonwealth, too. It 
had someone other than Britain in charge of the Commonwealth. 
 
I do not recall, exactly, who initiated the idea of the CCFMSA. It could well 
have been Sonny Ramphal; a lot was at that time. But we were anticipating 
the first meeting of the committee to be at the Vancouver CHOGM, which it 
was. I unwisely adjourned that first meeting so we could go to Her Majesty’s 
reception at the hotel up the road, and by the time we got back, Witness 
Mangwende – then the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister – had become much 
more outspoken in his resentment of the British, and he took it out on 
Geoffrey Howe, who was then Britain’s Foreign Secretary, and participated in 
the Vancouver CCFMSA. It was a very uncomfortable meeting, and I recall 
that Ben Mkapa of Tanzania was superb at helping police proceedings, 
repeatedly banging on the table saying, “Let the chairman chair!” It was clear 
in those circumstances that, if it only took a couple of glasses of wine to get 
one of the other Commonwealth members into a rancorous attitude towards 
the British, we were better off with another chair. 
 
My recollection is that the habit on important Commonwealth matters had 
been to have a very clear British imprimatur. Other imprimaturs were 
important also, but Sonny Ramphal, at the helm, would bring the British in 
whenever he could. But when that would not let the Commonwealth function 
as effectively as it would, he’d turn to us and in other cases to Australia. The 
other country that was extremely active in that Southern Africa committee, by 
the way, was Australia: particularly when Gareth Evans was the minister. In 
fact, while a very central role – particularly, strategically – was played by both 
Sonny Ramphal and Emeka Anyaoku at Commonwealth headquarters, the 
actual resources were principally from the Departments of Foreign Affairs of 
Canada and of Australia. In 1984, when I became minister and Mulroney 
Prime Minister, apartheid in South Africa was an area where Canada was 
active, but it was not the priority it became. Organisationally there weren’t 
many high flyers who, when they came into the Department, were assigned to 
that file. They were assigned to files that looked like they’d fit the future more. 
When it became clear that the minister and the Prime Minister were strongly 
interested [in South Africa], we attracted two types of exceptional officers: 
some were high flyers who chose or were assigned there, and others were 
really good diplomats who were strategically very sound but had either been 
taken off the ‘fast track’ or had fallen into disfavour with personnel. As a team, 
that Southern Africa Task Force was superb. 
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SO:  So this was Personnel’s idea of hard labour? 
 
JC:  No, I don’t think so. I think they were saying, “I wish we could make better use 
of X because he’s got real talent”. So, they knew they had talent but they 
were in places where it was harder for that talent to be expressed, and some 
of those people were seconded to our internal Task Force on South Africa 
and made an immense difference. They were sound and informed and canny, 
and genuinely committed to what came to be seen as a ‘cause’. As just one 
example, at the 1985 CHOGM in Nassau, I was formally precluded from 
seeing the ANC because they were considered a terrorist organisation. So, 
one afternoon, Eric Bergbusch of our Task Force knocked on my door and 
said, “Why don’t you come to tea?” I said, “Sure. Where? With whom?” And 
he said, “Oh, just some friends over at the Zimbabwean cottage”, and there I 
met Thabo Mbeki and others, and established an essential personal 
relationship with the leadership of the ANC. More regularly, our Task Force – 
and, to some degree, its equivalent in Australia – identified actions, including 
sanctions, which could be applied across much of the Commonwealth and co-
ordinated their application. [They] commissioned research into the potential 
effectiveness of other measures which could be taken by governments or 
business or civil society, and maintained close liaison with interested civil 
society, within and outside South Africa, and with leaders of the ANC and 
other organizations opposing apartheid, providing material as well as moral 
support on behalf of the Commonwealth ‘family’, of which South Africa had 
been a prominent member and could, with reform, become once again. The 
member countries emphasised the Commonwealth members of the Front 
Line States, but represented the Commonwealth’s global membership: 
members were Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and, on occasion, the United Kingdom. The 
object of the Committee of Foreign Ministers was to intensify and maintain 
public and political pressure on the apartheid regime. Previously, the 
declarations of the Commonwealth could be seen as spitting in the wind 
because they occurred only every two years when the Heads of Government 
met. CCFMSA met every three to four months in the 1987-89 period, in 
different locales around the world, steadily ratcheting up pressure for change 
by agreeing on and applying common actions, including sanctions, and 
regularly publicizing our meetings and common actions – almost always with 
extensive coverage in, or reaching into, South Africa (see supplementary 
document on Canada and CCMSA).  
 
SO:  So they could either hunker down in true laager mentality, or they could 
launch some pre-emptive diplomacy. 
 
JC:  Previous to the CCFMSA, the South African regime could hunker down or 
they could launch pre-emptive diplomacy. But they knew CHOGM was 
coming. It was a fixed date on their calendar, as it was on ours. So we had to 
find some means to make the pressure more repetitive at the cutting edge. 
The easy part was to schedule meetings every few months, and thus, by and 
large, generate media coverage. The hard part was to determine and then 
ration out – over a period of time we could predict – the measures that we 
could take that would command sufficient apparent support from all or most of 
the members of the Commonwealth. So, each meeting we would have a new 
range of actions. Some would be sanctions, some would be something else. 
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SO:  So this was for the Commonwealth to maintain a degree of initiative and 
proactive diplomacy that would help to wrong foot the National Party 
leadership? 
 
JC:  It kept the multinational Commonwealth in the picture and mounted 
international pressure on the apartheid regime through that period. And, on 
trade matters in particular, we could also apply some pressure – often 
bilaterally – upon nations beyond the huge Commonwealth who were our 
allies or trading partners. I remember a bilateral meeting in that period with 
Japan, in Tokyo. I opened our 2-day consultation by saying, “I’ve been 
looking at your trade figures and despite the United Nations agreement, your 
trade with South Africa is going up.” They said, “That can’t be,” but the next 
day my Japanese counterpart came back and said that there had been some 
inadvertencies which had now [been] corrected and Japan was supporting its 
commitments to the UN. Now, I don’t want to make too much of this except to 
make the point that we were able to invoke, bilaterally and outside the 
Commonwealth, to use a policy on which the Commonwealth had status, to 
prick the sense of what was appropriate of a significant non-Commonwealth 
government that took seriously its adherence to United Nations commitments. 
 
SO:  Because, under your leadership as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada 
was the only G7 country which was taking such a proactive stance on 
sanctions toward South Africa. 
 
JC:  Yes, we were. 
 
SO:  You are describing operating within a broader consensus of 
Commonwealth countries, even if Britain was notoriously 
obstructionist? 
 
JC:  Mulroney raised Commonwealth issues every G7 summit he attended; I did, 
too. But he raised them at the leaders’ table and often Mrs Thatcher 
disagreed. I personally believe she was not a supporter of apartheid, either. 
She just thought the means were counter-productive. And so the Mulroney 
government kept the pressure on over a more sustained period of time, and 
outside the Commonwealth as well as within. 
 
SO:  So was this very much at Canada’s own initiative? Or was it in 
collaboration and discussion with Sonny Ramphal, the Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth? 
 
JC:  If your question is about the establishment of the leadership Canada applied, 
there’s no question Sonny Ramphal would have been involved and would 
have approved. The question I can’t answer is whose idea it was. But it was 
adopted quite quickly and accepted broadly and, to my recollection, did not 
originally begin as being Canadian chaired. There were 2 reasons that 
happened, I think. One was Canada’s capacity and resources, but the other 
was that I was the only other minister in the mix who has been elected and 
served as Prime Minister, so I had an extra authority among my colleagues. 
 
SO:  Sir, thank you for setting out very clearly Canada’s attitude to the 
Commonwealth and multilateralism, and Canada’s particular policy 
towards apartheid South Africa. Please, if I could just take you back a 
little bit. When you came into politics in the 1970s, was international 
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affairs at all a domestic issue, a point of internal party tension with the 
Progressive Conservatives? Or was there broad consensus from within 
your political party? 
 
JC:  There are two answers to that, which are consistent answers. One is that 
international issues have rarely been a political issue in Canada, in part 
because we’re not a conventional international power. The Free Trade 
Agreement with the USA was the one international issue which had an impact 
upon a Canadian election result. I can recall where there was an international 
issue. The second is that – to be fair to everybody – had Cabinet decisions 
been taken on an equal vote for every minister, we probably would not have 
engaged in the South Africa campaign; certainly, not with the vigour we did. 
But Cabinets don’t run that way. The Prime Minister and I were both very 
strongly in favour of this, as were people like Flora MacDonald and several 
others. And it wasn’t that ministers were opposed to it – although there were 
one or two members of our parliamentary caucus who probably were 
opposed, who on that issue would have felt at home in Mrs Thatcher’s 
caucus. 
 
SO:  Though possibly not from her ‘hand-bagging’ style? [Laughs] 
 
JC:  No! But in their view of the world. But, none the less, the Canadian ministers 
who might have followed a different priority were influential ministers – they 
were smart people – but they just did not share the commitment of Brian and 
myself and others such as Flora, who regarded this as a Progressive 
Conservative tradition, on its merits of course, but also because we 
considered it a defining part of the Red Tory tradition of the Progressive 
Conservative party. An important factor to remember is that we had been the 
outside party for a long time in Canada, and one consequence was that some 
people expected us to act abysmally when we came to office. For example, 
the Heads of Mission of two or three Central American countries would not 
meet me when I first became Foreign Minister, because the name of my party 
was the Progressive Conservative party and they associated “Conservative” 
with Ronald Reagan. 
 
SO:  So, simply the label ‘Conservative’ was enough to cast you as 
consorting with the ‘spawn of the devil’? 
 
JC:  Yes. That was a factor we had to bear in mind. It led to some tensions within 
the party, and some of the later developments in Canada - including the 
merger to form the present Harper Conservative party - were animated to 
some degree by some sense that we had not acted in a narrower 
Conservative tradition. But that wasn’t a big factor at the time. The rest of the 
cabinet, I think, simply accepted that there were policies that both Mulroney 
and I – the successor leaders of the party – supported. 
 
SO:  During your time as Premier in 1979-1980, how far did your particular 
experience of the Lusaka CHOGM and Canada’s policy contribution 
towards the Commonwealth monitoring force – as well as having 
election observers there – help to establish your party’s credentials as 
being a confident, capable party in terms of managing foreign policy? 
 
JC:  It’s interesting. I expect some other countries at the Lusaka CHOGM were a 
little apprehensive about our new government – more because we were new, 
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than because of any real concern about our basic position. The Liberal Party 
had been in office for 16 years, and Mr. Trudeau, personally, had been an 
emphatic presence. That apprehension waned in the first day’s discussion 
and, when that first day ended, Kenneth Kaunda beckoned me over and said, 
“The things you’re saying are very much like those Mr Trudeau said.” And I 
replied, “Of course, Mr. President. We represent the same country.” 
Nonetheless, I was very new. I had been in office a little more than two 
months, but that period had included a G7 Summit – just days after my 
swearing in – and a leading role in the response to the “boat people” cast 
adrift in the China Sea. Flora MacDonald had established her own positive 
and empathetic reputation as Foreign Minister, and many of our senior 
officials were well-known and respected in Commonwealth circles. Moreover, 
we were not the only “new” government at that CHOGM. 
 
Mrs Thatcher had been in office only a little longer and, implying no slight to 
her, the heavy work at Lusaka was done by Peter Carrington – obviously, 
always with her agreement and authority. He would be very careful about 
that. In our case as well, officials played a key role on issues with which they 
had been involved for some time. The principal lesson which Flora and I took 
away from Lusaka was the clear demonstration that the Commonwealth can 
work. It could get agreement, it could draw people together. It was evident 
that that was due to more than simply the skill and commitment of the 
individuals who were there. There was an evident institutional capacity, all the 
more remarkable given the diversity of the countries and governments 
represented. Among other things, I was very impressed by the Queen just 
because she was so effective, respectful and yet authoritative in dealing with 
Prime Ministers and ministers in relatively small groups. She had a series of 
luncheons which were a tour de force in the way she encouraged consensus. 
Have you seen the movie ‘Argo’? 
 
SO:  Yes, I have. I have a little note here: ‘ask about American hostages’. 
 
JC:  I’m going to raise it now because, from my point of view, rescuing American 
diplomats who were hostages in Iran in a highly unpredictable period was a 
relatively simple decision. My officials, I learned later, were surprised; some of 
them said they doubted Mr Trudeau would have made the same decision – 
certainly not so quickly, perhaps not at all. We made it very quickly, not least 
because those six Americans were already under the protection of our 
Ambassador, Ken Taylor, and his associates. Both delay and publicity would 
have been highly risky. Officials immediately briefed Flora upon receiving Ken 
Taylor’s cable. That was on a morning, in the late morning. The House of 
Commons was sitting at 2 PM and the first time Flora and I had a chance to 
see one another was at Question Period; she came to me right after Question 
Period and said, “This is the situation”, and asked my direction. 
 
SO:  So this was in November of 1979. 
 
JC:  This would have been November of 1979. I said immediately, “We have to 
help them get out.” And she said, “I’m glad you said that, because I agree.” 
And we then set things in train. That was simply the natural thing to do; the 
Americans were friends of ours. They were in trouble and we were in a 
position – we, alone, in that particular set of circumstances – where we could 
help them or leave them. So we helped them. In that sense it was a simple 
decision. We had a sense of being a part of a family that was facing a difficult 
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and significant choice. I don’t want to exaggerate the parallel, but there was a 
comparable situation at the Zambia CHOGM and it was similarly natural for 
us to be part of that Commonwealth decision, that ‘family’ decision – 
probably, in those circumstances, as a very new government, with ministers 
relatively new to the actual dynamics of the Commonwealth, influenced more 
by our relationship to the UK and our respect for their leadership of the 
traditional Commonwealth on a difficult and significant issue. 
 
SO:  There’s also the question of ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing. 
 
JC:  Yes, that denotes trust. But it was not a factor very much on those questions. 
In one of my early briefings as Foreign Minister about the UN I asked, “What 
exactly are ‘like-minded countries’?” It speaks of countries with whom one 
normally finds common positions. Canada has an unusually deep and 
complex history in both the case of the UK and, as was evident on the 
hostage issue, the US. Our connection with the Commonwealth, as such, 
began historically with Britain and was then deepened and extended to the 
wide variety of other countries whose systems had also emanated from 
Britain, through common ventures like the 1960 CHOGM decision on South 
Africa, and the Zimbabwe discussions at Lusaka. But in my native corner of 
Alberta, I was not the only one who grew up conscious of being in what we 
regarded as the British tradition. The country grew up that way. In a particular 
way, many francophone Quebecers grew up knowing that they had benefited 
from a British sense of pragmatism that showed real respect for French-
speaking Canada’s distinctive culture and identity, after Canada’s small 
equivalent of a civil war – the brief Battle of the Plains of Abraham, which the 
British narrowly won. Quebec’s capacity to remain a ‘distinct society’ was 
rooted directly in the British decisions after that battle: to retain and respect 
the French language, the civil code of law and – in that agricultural age – the 
system of land tenure which was French, not British. Historically, then, the 
Commonwealth was an Anglo-Saxon institution, and our challenge and our 
opportunity now is that the cultural nature of the Commonwealth has 
broadened significantly, not simply as our membership increases, but as 
more of those “newer” members become more confident and assertive, and 
the dominance of Britain and the ‘traditional Commonwealth’ declines. 
Significantly, the internal cultural nature of that ‘traditional Commonwealth’ – 
the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa – has also broadened. 
The defining connections have grown beyond what they were. Our Anglo-
Saxon roots and institutions remain a strong and defining bond, and that 
quality of pragmatism is more relevant than ever, but our diversity is now 
much more than geographic. That should be an advantage, as the institution 
looks forward. 
 
SO:  If I could just take you back to that time when you were first in office, as 
you say, to that short time in 1979-80. Your experience of the Lusaka 
CHOGM showed you the utility of high level summitry: the utility of the 
Commonwealth and key officials. 
 
JC:  And the capacity to get agreement. 
 
SO:  But you also made reference to the parallel key clandestine activity of 
the international affairs of Canada: assisting the United States at a 
particularly critical juncture in the hostage crisis in Tehran. Was there 
private Commonwealth support? I know the Brits – in the very early 
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stages, in the first 24 hours, of the invasion of the American Embassy in 
Tehran – were trying to help; and the New Zealanders were also trying 
to help. Was there support for Canada in this particular juncture? 
 
JC:  We didn’t tell our allies (apart, naturally, from President Carter and his closest 
advisors, whose citizens were hostages). I don’t know precisely what my 
officials did but I think we didn’t tell anyone. We were holding it very, very 
closely in Canada. I didn’t tell Cabinet, beyond saying, “I need 12 passports 
and please don’t ask me why, but trust me.” It takes four Privy Councillors to 
sign an order-in-council, so there were four of us: Flora and myself, and two 
others. I don’t know who Ken Taylor was talking to in Tehran, if anybody. He 
was probably keeping very quiet himself, and I’d be very surprised if 
Canadian officials spoke to their counterparts abroad. Many of our senior 
officials didn’t know including in Foreign Affairs. Some expressed their regret 
later on about being kept out of the loop because we kept the loop very 
narrow. As a parliamentarian, I had personally briefed Mr Trudeau as Leader 
of the Opposition, and was quite surprised – and disappointed – when he 
made allusions in Question Period which could have drawn attention to the 
role Canada was playing. That confirmed the wisdom of keeping the 
information loop very limited. 
 
SO:  I was particularly struck when I interviewed Flora MacDonald and when I 
was talking to her about the Lusaka CHOGM. To me, as an historian, the 
Lusaka meeting is particularly interesting for the question of issues, 
policies, dynamics of meetings, discussions in Kenneth Kaunda’s 
study, etc. Yet her recollection of that time was particularly the hostage 
crisis. It was very clear that what I thought was important in the 
Commonwealth, in fact, was not what she remembered as being 
important in the second half of 1979. 
 
JC:  The hostage crisis was later and naturally looms larger in Flora’s recollection, 
not least because it was a gruelling period, and information was so tightly 
held. She was also intensely involved, from the summer on, as a leader in the 
international response to the crisis of the boat people. 
 
SO:  It was just her particular recollection of 1979 was not the resolution of 
the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe issue: it was emphasizing the hostage 
question.  
 
You then stepped down as Prime Minister in March 1980, just around 
the time when Robert Mugabe was elected as Prime Minister. Do you 
recall at all your impressions of the outcome of that election? Does it 
register at all in your memory? 
 
JC:  Not particularly. I recall very positive discussions with Mugabe in the 1980s 
on apartheid questions. I recall his first wife was with him in almost all those 
discussions. 
  
SO:  Sally Mugabe. 
 
JC:  I can remember a couple of cases where he was becoming unusually 
assertive and she did something as simple as lean forward in her chair and 
he… ‘Subsided’ is not quite the right word… But there was a grading-down 
and he reverted to an easier attitude. 
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SO:  There was an adjustment? 
 
JC:  There was an adjustment of his position. And I think she played an immensely 
important role in his attitude. Canadians knew him then in a particular context, 
although we didn’t work with him on a regular basis. He had been schooled 
by Canadians and that was always a factor in our minds and in his mind; a 
factor for good, we thought at the time. 
 
SO:  So he was schooled by Canadian Jesuits? 
 
JC:  They would have been Canadian Jesuits, yes. 
 
SO:  In 1981, obviously, you were no longer serving Prime Minister, nor yet 
again the Foreign Minister. However, the ZIMCORD meeting – the great 
multilateral donors meeting – took place in Harare that year, and Canada 
played a leading role in terms of Zimbabwe’s post-conflict 
reconstruction and development. How far would you say that reflected a 
Canadian desire for Zimbabwe to work as a multi-racial, broadly 
capitalist country, set against South Africa? 
 
JC:  I can’t answer that. For a long time in Canadian international history socialist 
or social democratic policies were not a bar to co-operation. Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker pointedly maintained diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro’s 
Cuba, and subsequent Canadian governments followed that lead. Similarly, 
we maintained active development relations in Nicaragua under the 
Sandinistas. That open-mindedness in international policy pertained to the 
Commonwealth. Our largest trading partner and an overwhelming presence is 
our neighbour next door, and the Mulroney government was determined to 
make the best of that arrangement. We could and we did on major issues: the 
free trade agreement, which we proposed and they responded; [and] on a 
difficult environmental question on acid rain, where President Reagan did not 
believe there was a scientific cause of acid rain. 
 
SO:  I remember the news report of Press Secretary James Brady running up 
and down Air Force One, when it was flying high over dense woodland, 
crying, “Killer trees! Killer trees!”  
 
JC:  So we were cooperating with them on a lot of issues. I believed, and the 
Prime Minister accepted, that we needed also to emphasise areas in which 
we had genuine differences from the United States – and to do that without 
sticking them in the eye, and keeping them fully informed about what we were 
doing. I refer to that as investing the two sides of Canada’s international coin. 
The Commonwealth was significant in that strategy because the 
Commonwealth was a non-American entity in which we were already 
intending to play an active role, but that “other side of the coin” factor made it 
particularly valuable to us as a counterbalance to our close involvement with 
the Americans. 
 
SO:  Did you have a particularly distinct dimension to your Caribbean policy 
then in the 1980s? 
 
JC:  The question I can’t answer is whether the strong interest Canada showed in 
the Caribbean – earlier on – was Commonwealth-based, or neighbourhood-
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based. It was certainly Commonwealth-influenced and it was substantial, both 
in terms of development assistance and in the relative regularity of contact 
between Canadian and Caribbean leaders. That personal contact was not a 
trivial matter. In effect, the “international world” was smaller in the 1960s and 
1970s, in that long-distance travel was not as easy, there were fewer trans-
Atlantic or trans-Pacific “heads of government” or similar meetings of 
ministers or officials, beyond the Commonwealth. Those meetings are so 
numerous now that the actual contact among leaders, and probably officials, 
is often almost perfunctory, as everyone has their eye on their next flight. 
Some of the earlier relationships were quite personal. Mr Diefenbaker and, I 
believe, Mr Pearson holidayed in the Caribbean, so were not distant figures 
and had personal relationships which buttressed the relatively higher degree 
of development assistance, commercial and educational connections, in that 
period. Part of that was proximity, in an age that was by no means global, but 
part of it was also ‘family’, flowing significantly from Commonwealth 
connections. As an example, early in my period as Foreign Minister, the Fall 
of 1984, when Mrs Gandhi was assassinated, I invited the foreign ministers or 
heads of government of the Commonwealth Caribbean to come to the 
funeral, on Canada’s large plane and scores of us travelled together, as a 
Commonwealth family to a death in the family. And I think that that reflected a 
greater closeness in relations at that time. 
 
SO: You’ve talked very eloquently about your and Premier Brian Mulroney’s 
particular agenda for Canada as a member of the G7, pushing forward a 
proactive policy on apartheid South Africa. Obviously the Nassau 
CHOGM in 1985 was of key importance in launching the Eminent 
Persons Group. Was that a particular Canadian initiative? I know that 
Nassau is a heads of government meeting, rather than a Foreign 
Ministers’ meeting, but I just wondered… 
 
JC:  I had to fight to get to Nassau. Mr Mulroney and I had been opponents in two 
party leadership campaigns and we had both deliberately built an excellent 
working relation, but it wasn’t always easy. (In October 1985 Mr Mulroney had 
publically denounced the apartheid government in his speech at the UN. 
Unless there were signs of meaningful change, the PM stated, relations with 
South Africa might have to be severed absolutely). Key members of his staff 
were anxious that I not come to a “Heads of Government” meeting, but he 
and I agreed that it would be more sensible for me to be in Nassau, because 
of the South African issue. 
 
SO:  So what level meeting were you able to attend? Were you able to sit in 
on the Heads of Government meeting? You wouldn’t have gone to the 
retreat?  
 
JC:  I didn’t go to the retreat, but took full advantage of the opportunity to meet 
with leaders of the Front Lines States, the ANC, and others. At the Vancouver 
CHOGM I was invited to the Okanagan retreat because I was the chair of the 
CCFMSA. 
 
SO:  Was that unusual? 
 
JC:  I think the attendance of Foreign Ministers at the retreat of “Heads of 
Government” was unusual. I don’t know who specifically proposed the 
Eminent Persons Group at Nassau, but assume it was Sonny. And, in 
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retrospect, the Eminent Persons Group was really the last attempt at 
conciliation. It was the pre-sanctions period of the Commonwealth and 
Canada was very heavily engaged: Archbishop Ted Scott played an active 
role himself, as our Eminent Person. But we also provided aircraft and other 
logistic support. We put our resources as well as our good name behind the 
anti-apartheid effort in almost all of its incarnations from 1984 on. 
 
SO:  Did you recommend Archbishop Edward Scott to be the Canadian 
representative on the EPG? 
 
JC:  We had originally thought of another person who was a francophone Rector 
of the University of Ottawa. I think that came from Brian, and probably had to 
do with the interest in having, in bringing, able francophones into prominent 
roles on these issues. But he declined. I wish I remember how Ted’s name 
came up – perhaps from the Canadian NGO community – [but] we were 
delighted by his performance. 
 
SO:  How closely did he stay in touch with you? 
 
JC: Very. We became friends and I was proud to be invited to read a lesson at his
 funeral. 
 
SO:  So Ted Scott was sending you regular briefings back in addition to the 
contacts you had with the Secretariat? 
 
JC:  Yes. 
 
SO:  So he would have done that through the Canadian High Commission in 
London, or the Canadian Embassy in South Africa? 
 
JC:  Probably – and sometimes in personal conversations. Ted was also in regular 
contact with my staff and officers. 
 
SO:  I know that, under the leadership of Malcolm Fraser and Olusegun 
Obasanjo, the EPG started off in Lusaka before they went down into 
South Africa. The irony is, according to South African Foreign Minister 
Pik Botha, that if it hadn’t been for Mrs Thatcher – who appeared the 
most obstructionist part of the Commonwealth at that point on the 
surface – President P W Botha would never have allowed the EPG into 
the country. 
 
JC:  Well, Tony Barber was a member. 
 
SO:  Indeed. 
 
JC:  We were a little worried about that. I knew him only as the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. 
 
SO:  And a director of Standard Chartered Bank. 
 
JC:  He turned out to be a very constructive member of the Group, from everything 
I heard. 
 
SO:  I think he saw a very different side of South Africa. 
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JC: It seems to me that some of the information we got back from Ted Scott came 
through our High Commissioners in other countries, and we maintained very 
high quality of representatives at our embassy in South Africa and resisted 
proposals to close that embassy. Stephen Lewis was our eloquent and 
passionate ambassador to the United Nations and had been involved in the 
anti-apartheid campaign as a social democrat. Among his considerable 
strengths was a deep and evident empathy with ambassadors and other 
leaders from the developing world, whose advice and perspective 
supplemented our information from traditional sources. 
 
He was an advocate of shutting the embassy down, and he almost persuaded 
Brian. I considered it to be very important and effective – not simply as a 
source of diplomatic and logistic support but also as a symbol and an 
instrument of our strong relationship with civil society and other opponents of 
the apartheid system within South Africa. At one point, the spouse of our 
Ambassador, Ron McLean, marched in the parade of the Black Sash; [she] 
was knocked down by the spray from a fire hose with the cameras running, 
and got up again and continued the march. That sort of personal 
determination and presence helped make our case – among ordinary South 
Africans, and at home. 
 
SO:  Was there – that you were aware of – a particular utility to the regular 
meetings of Commonwealth ambassadors in South Africa? 
 
JC:  In South Africa or here? 
 
SO:  In South Africa, as well as outside. I know Len Allison, when he was 
British High Commissioner in Lusaka, made reference to using those 
weekly meetings of High Commissioners as a great way to get an 
audience with the Zambian government. 
 
JC:  I’m sure it was. I should have asked that question but don’t know. 
 
SO:  I just wondered if it had registered at all. 
 
JC:  A lot of that happened. It still happens in conflict zones. And High 
Commissioners in the UK met regularly.  
 
SO:  The London group of High Commissioners associated very closely with 
the Commonwealth Secretariat, forming a committee on Southern 
Africa. 
 
JC:  That’s right. But they also helped us build and maintain support at home, 
because leaders – including business leaders from Canada, who might not 
necessarily have been immersed in the anti-apartheid campaign – heard 
about it at dinner when they visited. 
 
SO:  Moving onto the Vancouver CHOGM and your own role in the 
Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa. 
CCFMSA, of course, met between 1988 and 1991, but you made 
reference to a conversation with South African Foreign Minister Pik 
Botha in 1987. Was that before Vancouver? 
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JC:  Yes, here’s the story. When was the Vancouver CHOGM? 
 
SO:  The fall of ‘87. 
 
JC:  That summer, I began to think about the Vancouver CHOGM and what could 
go wrong. What occurred to me was that it would not be at all uncharacteristic 
for Mrs Thatcher to fly to Vancouver by way of South Africa, and arrive in 
Vancouver and say, “You don’t know what’s going on in South Africa. I have 
just been there.” Assuming she did that, what could we do to counter? And it 
occurred to me that the best thing I could do would be to go myself – as the 
Foreign Minister of the host country – to have a report that could be 
presented to the Vancouver CHOGM. We called all the Front Line States and 
got their agreement. I had an opening because, some months before, Pik 
Botha and I had been together at an unrelated meeting and he had said, “You 
don’t know what you’re talking about. You’ve never been there. You don’t 
know. Come and visit.” I reminded him of that and said, “I’m accepting your 
invitation.” I recall it was a fascinating visit because our Canadian aircraft had 
to stop twice to refuel. In Ghana, our High Commissioner came to the airport 
and said, “I have a telegram for you from Mr Botha.” And it was, “If you are 
coming down here to cause trouble, turn around and go right home.” When 
we got there, the plan had been for a meeting of 15-20 people. And Pik Botha 
said, “We don’t need all these people. Why don’t you and I and one other 
each just talk?” My deputy minister Si Taylor was with me, and his Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs with him. We had about a several-hour 
conversation. 
 
SO:  Where was this? In Pretoria? 
 
JC:  This was in Pretoria, yes. The conversation was discursive, often. There was 
talk of communists and the kind of thing you’d expect. But, there was also the 
sense that there were changes afoot. It became clear that they were not 
looking at a fundamental reform but some changes in relations between the 
apartheid and anti-apartheid forces in South Africa itself. And gestures toward 
the black majority. 
 
SO:  There had also been clandestine discussions with the ANC outside the 
country at that particular point. 
 
JC:  Yes, there had. I learned more about those a little later. Some of those 
discussions were fairly closely held… What are your timelines for this project? 
 
SO:  This project is running for another 2½ years. 
 
JC: Okay, I will find out [about the minutes to the Botha discussion]. Make sure 
you get me a note on it: it’s Si Taylor and it was the Record of Discussion in 
South Africa, it must have been the fall of 1987. 
 
SO:  So September/October? 
 
JC:  I think so, perhaps late August. 
  
SO:  I’m also in touch with Greg Donaghy, the historian at the Canadian 
Library and Archives. And he’s given me excellent advice on how to… 
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JC:  Well, and Greg would know.  
 
SO:  So, thank you, that would be excellent. So you had an extensive and 
discursive discussion with Pik Botha and gathered the sense that there 
were moves towards liberalising apartheid, even if they weren’t 
necessarily as fast as…  
 
JC:  But we didn’t know whether that was just a story for us. We thought it wasn’t, 
but it could have been. Certainly, it did not change our view going into the 
Vancouver CHOGM that we would need to keep up pressure.  
 
SO: So, after Vancouver, of course, with the creation of the Foreign 
Ministers Committee, how often did you meet? 
 
JC:  I think six times – Lusaka, Toronto, Harare, Canberra, Kuala Lumpur 
[CHOGM] and Abuja, after Mr Mandela’s release. 
 
SO:  So every couple of months? 
 
JC: Yes. The testimony was fascinating, and our studies and post-meeting 
declarations were well-covered by the media, including in South Africa and 
key Commonwealth countries, and among civil society groups who were 
interested in the issue. On most occasions – perhaps all – I reported to 
Parliament on my return as, I believe, did other of my colleagues. I don’t want 
to exaggerate our impact, but we achieved our goal of maintaining steady and 
strong public pressure by the Commonwealth, and to secure broad 
acceptance of escalating sanctions and pressure. (During the Fourth meeting 
in Canberra, Canada made a number of specific pledges which were cut at 
the last minute. We committed $14.7 m to assist black education in South 
Africa, and we committed resources to help FLS through the Military Training 
Assistant Program. We created a $1.6m ‘Fund to Promote Dialogue Among 
South Africans’.)  But there was also a human dimension to those meetings, 
which reinforced and broadened our sense of acting as a family. It had never 
occurred to me that not all foreign ministers were equal, but there was one 
point, I think, in Harare, where I detected an undercurrent around the table 
about something that hadn’t come up on the agenda. So, we finished our 
formal business and I said, “Okay, what’s going on?” And I think Ben Mkapa 
asked, “Who’s going to bell the cat?” 
 
SO: [Laughs] 
 
JC:  It turned out that Zambia, Zimbabwe and it might have been Tanzania had 
some unrelated regional issue they wanted to raise with Jim Baker, the US 
Secretary of State. They asked me, “Would you call him and ask him if he 
would discuss this with us?” I said, “You call him. He’ll take your phone call.” 
And they replied, “Well, we think it would be better if you called him on our 
behalf.” So, I did, and Jim Baker quickly called them back and resolved the 
matter, which was not momentous. It was interesting that – on a matter that, 
while not momentous, was important to them – they were cautious about their 
capacity to speak to their US counterpart, who was a notoriously gregarious, 
outgoing person. They asked my help – in part in my Canadian capacity but 
also probably building upon the rapport we’d established around the table. Or 
they were testing the lengths to which I would go to help, which itself would 
reflect some sense of being in things together. 
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One of the Committee’s memorable discussions – perhaps because it was 
our first meeting after the Vancouver CHOGM – was in Lusaka, where Beyers 
Naude had been smuggled across the border to speak to us as a prominent 
former minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, which had promulgated a 
religious justification of apartheid. After the Sharpeville Massacre, he could no 
longer defend that political teaching, and became an outspoken and 
respected critic of apartheid. He was a prominent ordained minister of the 
Afrikaner church whose whole faith had been somersaulted. His testimony 
revealed the depth and complexity of the attitude of the Afrikaans to 
apartheid, and he personified the reality that, within the Afrikaans community 
itself, there was angst and doubt and probably some willingness to move. 
 
In this context, I should note that right after my pre-Vancouver meeting in 
Pretoria with Pik Botha, I went on to Mozambique because – at the urging of 
the Commonwealth members of the Front Line States – Canada had invited 
Mozambique to come as an Observer to the Vancouver CHOGM. They were 
a key member of the Front Line States, but not then a member of the 
Commonwealth. They became one after the Vancouver CHOGM. 
 
SO:  Samora Machel had been killed in that plane crash in 1986. So this was 
his successor, Chissano?   
 
JC:  Chissano. And what was interesting about it… My relationship had been with 
the Foreign Minister, Dr Pascal Mocumbi, and Canada had been clearing 
forest cover to help the British keep the Beira rail line open for the Front Line 
States. Chissano was ill when I arrived: he had a serious flu. But we’d 
diverted from South Africa to Mozambique and he knew I couldn’t visit him 
again so he got out of his sick bed. And he said, “You know, the Afrikaans are 
as African as I am. They have nowhere else to go. Some of my colleagues 
forget that, but you shouldn’t forget that.” 
 
SO: Did you think in that way before this remark? 
 
JC:  I hadn’t thought enough about it, and it changed my perspective on the 
Afrikaans mentality though. What was significant was that this was an African 
Front Line State neighbour getting out of his sick-bed to make this case to 
me. 
 
SO: This was, I think, the foundational point of the connectivity between 
General Obasanjo and Pik Botha. Pik Botha said, “He recognised me as 
a fellow African”, with this sense of Afrikaners outlook of, “We are 
Africans of European decent, but we are not British imperial imports.” 
 
JC:  Probably, because the British could go home. And Chissano said, “There is 
no other home for the Afrikaans to go to. Their home is here. They’re as 
African as I am.” I hadn’t really considered that reality of the rootedness of the 
Afrikaans in South Africa and nowhere else. Interestingly, I work closely with 
FW De Klerk now. He’s the chair and I’m the vice-chair of the Global 
Leadership Foundation which is a group of 35 former heads of government 
and others who try to help leaders of developing countries navigate the 
political challenges of governance reform. I’d never met De Klerk until after I 
was out of Parliament. I led a Canadian group to South Africa and we visited 
him. What struck me and surprised me about him was that there are laugh 
21 
 
lines around his eyes – because my view, from afar, of the Afrikaans was that 
these are a pretty stern people. 
 
SO: Dour? 
 
JC: Dour. And he is not. And since we’ve been together I’ve come to appreciate 
him. And he tells his side of the story. One of the things I had not known 
before was that PW Botha, as President, invented these retreats of cabinet in 
which he used to indoctrinate his ministers. 
 
SO: ‘Bosberaad,’ I think they called them. Yes, at Nyala. 
 
JC: What’s that they’re called? 
 
SO: Basically a bush retreat at Nyala, in South Africa.  
 
JC:  And De Klerk continued them, but with the exact opposite purpose. De Klerk 
said, “I couldn’t expect the Afrikaans people to acquiesce in what I was doing 
unless the party did, and I couldn’t expect the party to do it unless their 
leaders did.” 
 
The other thing I meant to say about that conversation with Pik Botha is that 
he left the impression that, if there was to be a change, he would probably be 
the leader of that change. It was a quite clever performance on his part 
because, on the one hand, he was as hard line as he would need, to report 
he had been, to whomever in his government he was reporting to. And I think 
he also recognised that, while we were adversaries on the issue of apartheid, 
we were not inherently adversarial to South Africa. Certainly, our intent was 
the opposite of trying to bring South Africa to its knees, so this [could] be a 
more constructive conversation than the fight we’d had in Greece. 
 
SO: After you became chair of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign 
Ministers on South Africa, did you meet Pik Botha again in any 
capacity? 
 
JC: I don’t think I did. 
 
SO: Do you recall what your impression was going into the Kuala Lumpur 
CHOGM? By this point, De Klerk had become both National Party leader 
and President, by August of 1989. Did you have any sense at that 
particular point in time that change was accelerating and afoot, that you 
recall? 
 
JC:  Without quantifying it, we did. But not enough to stop our pressure. There 
was, you know, a quite dramatic British-related development at the Kuala 
Lumpur CHOGM. Membership in CCFMSA had remained open to the British 
if they wanted to come. And John Major was the Foreign Secretary at the 
time, and it happened that I had been his first visitor as Foreign Secretary. 
What struck me about that first meeting was that, looking at John Major’s 
public biography, at that time, could lead you to underestimate the man. This 
was very early on after his swearing in, and I think he had been up most of 
the night briefing for the first foreign minister to visit. The Canada/UK briefs 
are not that complicated, but he was determined to be on top of every issue, 
and he was. He was serious and sympathetic and we established a good 
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rapport. He came to the Foreign Ministers meeting in KL and played a quite 
constructive role. He was baited and pushed by some of my colleagues, but 
the meeting was quite constructive, and found some common ground – 
related to the approach to sanctions, as I recall. I forget on what it was: 
[some] small but not unimportant matter, which Mrs Thatcher repudiated at 
the plenary Heads of Government table the next day. It was a hard time for 
John Major. 
 
SO:  He describes it as ‘a mauling’ in his memoirs. 
 
JC:  Kuala Lumpur was the last CHOGM I attended. I was in another portfolio by 
the time Harare came along. But certainly, during the time I was in the chair of 
the Foreign Ministers Committee, I don’t think it ever occurred to us that we 
had to let up pressure on the UK or on South Africa.Things had not reached 
that point. 
 
SO: Just to ask, Sir, about the comparison between Geoffrey Howe’s 
management of the position of Foreign Secretary that you saw in 
Southern Africa, compared to John Major that you saw coming in. You 
said Major was very swift to master his brief. He’s very much a 
consensus politician, and a very effective politician as well. Did you see 
a marked difference in styles between the two on this particular issue of 
South Africa? 
 
JC:  I knew Geoffrey better. In fact, Geoffrey and I, Mrs Thatcher and Flora had all 
been together at the G7 summit in Tokyo – all as members of new 
governments. Geoffrey and I had established a friendship, and Elspeth with 
my wife. In fact, we had a wonderful time one weekend at the residence of the 
Foreign Secretary here. 
 
SO:  Chevening? 
 
JC:  Which is in a valley and has a hill beside it. At the time, our daughter 
Catherine was 8 or 9. We all walked up to the top of the hill and Elspeth said 
to Catherine, “You know, there’s a fast way down.” 
 
SO: Roly poly? 
 
JC:  They rolled down the hill. 
 
SO:  [Laughs] 
 
JC:  Which was all Elspeth. So I knew…I know Geoffrey well. I didn’t know John 
Major as well. I think the practical difference would be that I was quite 
confident where Geoffrey would come out on any question, and I didn’t know 
John Major well enough to make that assumption about where he would 
come out. 
 
SO: Sir, it’s often been said that part of the summitry of Commonwealth 
meetings is the personal chemistry between leaders. Would you say it’s 
also a question of personal chemistry between foreign ministers? 
 
JC:  Often it is. Certainly, that was a factor contributing to the effectiveness of the 
CCFMSA. The leaders dominate, though, at CHOGM; and in our case the 
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important dynamic was Thatcher-Mulroney because Mulroney could say 
things to Mrs Thatcher that I don’t think others could, or did. 
 
SO:  I do know that Flora MacDonald took a rather dim view of Mrs 
Thatcher’s style. 
 
JC:  She did at the time and more emphatically later – in part, I think, because of 
her experience in the UK. Flora had been defeated in the 1988 Free Trade 
election – as were most of our candidates in eastern Ontario – and she was 
invited to teach at the University of Edinburgh. She was surprised that the 
status of women in the UK was nowhere near as advanced as the status of 
women in Canada. I think that – whatever her feelings about Mrs Thatcher 
had been before – she found that difference all the more surprising with a 
woman as Prime Minister. Flora and Barbara McDougall and others who were 
ministers in our government took a very active role to ensure that they were 
not alone in their progress, and Mrs Thatcher, I think, did not. 
 
SO:  Yes. Having punched through the glass ceiling, she was not going to be 
a feminist who favoured discrimination for women to follow her. She felt 
that it was a question of leading by example and if she could do it, 
others could do it too. It was a very different style of feminism. 
 
JC:  Yes, and I think that hardened Flora’s attitude more than when we were all in 
government together. 
 
SO:  While you were Foreign Minister, then, were your main energies directed 
towards the question of apartheid South Africa? Or was that to distort, 
in fact, where the balance of your activities lay? 
 
JC:  It was a very high priority but it was an active foreign ministry. We had 
resources of both budget and talent. The Prime Minister’s principal focus was 
on Canada/US relations but he was also very interested and engaged in 
asserting Canada’s international reputation and influence. It is probably true 
that he understood, later than I did, the importance of balancing the American 
emphasis with others and throughout his Prime Ministership he was very 
good at closing negotiations, bringing them to agreement. Canada was active 
literally everywhere. We extended our ‘fraternal’ membership to La 
Francophonie, an organization from which Canada had been absent before. 
We became active members of the Organisation of America States where, for 
a long time under various administrations, Canada had not occupied our seat 
at the hemispheric table. In large measure, that is because we played an 
active role in Central America – including, often, following a different course 
from the Reagan Administration. We became much more active in Asia than 
we had been before, and maintained strong trade and security and other 
relations in Europe. Our level of Official Development Assistance was the 
highest in Canadian history, and Canada regularly brought ‘developing 
country’ issues to the G7 table. So it was a very active period. But Southern 
Africa was a major issue. 
 
SO:  Did you have a particular Commonwealth dimension to your 
increasingly proactive Canadian policy towards South East Asia? Or in 
fact would that be a distorted interpretation? 
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JC:  No, that would distort it. In fact I was a failure in one central aspect of South 
East Asian diplomacy in that I don’t play golf… 
 
SO:  [Laughs] 
 
JC:  …but I overcame that. 
 
SO:  I just wondered if you’d taken a particular stance when Dr Mahathir 
came in and adopted very much a ‘Buy British Last’ stance? 
 
JC:  No. We had our own Canadian interests to pursue – in Malaysia, specifically, 
but also in the whole of ASEAN, where Canada was recognized early as a 
significant independent partner and as a committed multi-lateralist. I did, 
however, go out of my way to attempt to persuade Dr. Mahathir of the 
advantages of the Commonwealth as an international institution. I was in KL 
for an ASEAN meeting just after Mahathir had indicated he would not attend 
CHOGM at Nassau. I told him I had been sceptical about the CHOGM as a 
new Prime Minister, but I attended, and found it very valuable, and thought he 
would. He said, “It’s just another talk shop. We don’t need another talk shop.” 
And I suggested, “Well, why don’t you come to Nassau and see?” And he did, 
and, at Nassau offered KL as the site of the next meeting. It may well be that I 
was able to make that case to him more persuasively than a British foreign 
minister could, because Canada was a former colony ourselves… But the 
Commonwealth then had Singapore and Brunei, as well as Malaysia, as 
ASEAN members. But we didn’t play the Commonwealth card in particular 
there. Of course, it is the case that when you’re working intensely with people 
in one context, it is often easier to work intensely with them in others. 
 
SO:  Yes, so it’s a question of forging bonds of communality over issues, 
rather than that the Commonwealth acts as a bloc? It’s a multi-layered, 
multi-identity association, presumably. 
 
JC:  Yes, it’s a common home, in unusual places, and that creates a 
predisposition to give a benefit of the doubt to other Commonwealth countries 
when we meet in non-Commonwealth contexts. That relation is more like a 
‘family’, where the connections are roots and heritage, rather than a ‘club’, 
with binding rules of behaviour. The Commonwealth experience also imparts 
lessons which apply elsewhere. Certainly, the Commonwealth’s ability to 
bridge other divides encouraged Canada’s interest in joining and 
strengthening La Francophonie. When I can, I try to go out for a walk in 
countries I am visiting, and people often recognize me as a foreigner and 
want to practice their English. Canada’s fortunate to have two linguistic 
families. Several years ago, I was walking in Hanoi; in a park, and someone 
came up to me and said, “Parlez-vous francais?”  And I did and we had a little 
conversation in French. That had nothing to do with La Francophonie except 
the critical connection of culture. Those are ties that bind. 
 
 
SO:  Sir, if I could just take you back to Southern Africa: you’ve talked 
extensively about your own particular energies and input towards trying 
to hasten the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. But Canada, 
of course, also played a prominent part in the Contact Group on 
Namibia. 
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JC:  The hard work had been done before my time as minister, so I can’t speak 
authoritatively. But Canada played a prominent part. I think it was the first 
time we sent police officers in a sort of peace-keeping role. The late Don 
Jamieson was the minister at the time. 
 
SO:  Were you surprised, then, when De Klerk stood up in the National 
Assembly on the 2nd February 1990 and made his statement? 
 
JC:  I was; although, since the early signals by Pik Botha, we had been aware of 
changes in thinking. Time zones being what they were, I received what was 
literally a ‘wake-up’ call from Lucie Edwards who’d run our South Africa task 
force, and later became our High Commissioner to South Africa - 
 
SO:  With Caroline McMaster as her deputy? 
 
JC:  Yes, that’s right. 
 
SO:  Yes, I spoke to Caroline when I was in Ottawa. 
 
JC:  Lucie said, “I think you’d want to turn on your television set!” So we were 
surprised. I think the Department had a sense something was imminent but I 
didn’t. About two weeks after his release, Mr Mandela went to Lusaka to meet 
the ANC-in-exile. It was a relatively small meeting of ANC leaders – less than 
100 people, as I recall. In any event, I was invited as the chair of the 
CCFMSA as was the Irish Foreign Minister, Gerry Collins, because Ireland 
was in the chair of the EU. We were the two white faces in that room. When 
I’m asked what one event struck me most in my career in foreign policy, it 
was to be sitting in that room, experiencing first-hand the leadership and 
generosity of Nelson Mandela. Mr Mandela came in and after cheers and 
hurrahs, went to the front and began to speak. It was not a long speech, and 
then the first question that came – from his closest comrades in their long 
struggle – was highly critical of the Afrikaners. He said to the ANC-in-exile, 
“We have to remember how difficult this all is for them.” And I thought, how 
extraordinary, to show that kind of generosity towards his captors. That was 
not in any prepared text, although it was clearly something he came to say – 
to establish the tone he wanted his supporters to follow as they moved 
forward.  
 
SO:  He clearly had read de Tocqueville. 
 
JC:  I guess so. Or it was instinct. He was such an extraordinary individual and 
leader. 
 
SO:  Indeed. To come out after 27 years in jail and to show no signs of 
enduring animosity or hostility. That really is extraordinary. 
 
JC:  As I recall from the very moment of his release from prison, he urged the 
young people who had [fought] for his freedom to now go back to school to 
prepare for their futures. In Lusaka, that day, you could see the impact it 
made. Nobody was upset, they accepted his guidance and authority. 
 
SO:  Acknowledging the challenges ahead… Which was, how do you 
persuade the laager to negotiate an end of power? Because, of course, 
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at that particular point they were not prepared to negotiate the end of 
their hold on power. The National Party was intent on power-sharing. 
 
JC:  Yes, and it was what he didn’t say… but [it] was also true -- that if they 
continued the anger of the struggle, his capacity to negotiate would be 
sharply limited. 
 
SO:  My next question was, how far and in what ways has the Commonwealth 
successfully evolved since the Harare Declaration? For it could be said 
that the opposition to apartheid – or to white minority regimes in 
Southern Africa – really helped to provide an important part of the glue 
of the Commonwealth while you were Foreign Minister. 
 
JC:  Yes. It was the high point, and let me emphasise an institutional element of 
that success which is not always noted. One of the things that distinguishes 
the Commonwealth from other associations of nation-states is that a skilled 
and strong Commonwealth Secretariat can sometimes take important 
initiatives despite the reluctance of some leaders of member countries. Here’s 
the distinction: The Organisation of American States has an impressive series 
of declarations, but almost every time they try to act as an organization, 
sovereignty is invoked – often by an offending member state, but also 
because the assertion or protection of state sovereignty is so strict and strong 
that it virtually immobilizes significant group action. In the Sonny Ramphal 
period but also in Emeka’s, the Secretariat would sometimes lead its 
members so the interpretation of sovereignty was not as suffocating as it can 
be in other organisations. I think that became a Commonwealth style, 
perhaps deriving originally from historic British pragmatism and a sense that 
leaders had to look beyond the merely immediate. My sense of that is 
influenced by the history of Canada. The British won Canada’s very brief ‘civil 
war’, the battle of the Plains of Abraham, but they did not treat the French as 
vanquished. They kept the French language, and the civil code in law, and 
respected the French system of land tenure in Quebec and Manitoba and 
other francophone areas. I think that pragmatic instinct to consider the longer-
term consequences infused the Commonwealth at its beginning, and certainly 
in the anti-apartheid campaign. It represented a partnership of nation-states 
which each prized its independence but shared important values, and was 
prepared to advance them. Obviously, apartheid was a very specific case, 
and the 1980s were a different time. Comparable circumstances may not 
recur. So the question now is twofold: First, are there issues today where 
important Commonwealth-wide values need to be advanced? Second, is 
there a sufficient capacity at the centre, and willingness among key countries 
to lead? 
 
SO:  Indeed. Coming out of the Harare Declaration of 1991, with Chief Emeka 
as the new Secretary General, [it was] determined that this voluntary 
association should have democracy and human rights as the declared 
core values. Part of that was to support democracy and elections. I 
know that you were involved in the Cameroon election monitoring 
mission. How did that come about? 
 
JC: Well, three things. First, the team that was brought together was first class. 
I’ve led, or been involved in, other delegations where you wonder sometimes, 
“How did that person get here?” But these were very able people, reflecting a 
variety of complementary experience from across the Commonwealth, and 
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the Commonwealth staff were superb. That’s not trivial because this was a 
team whose members knew how to work, respectfully and effectively, in a 
country like Cameroon. Secondly, we found a fairly alarming set of problems 
with the fairness and organization of the election but we agreed – largely at 
my instigation – that we would be forthright in our reporting about what we’d 
found, but we would frame our commentary and recommendations in a tone 
that would allow the Commonwealth to come back quickly and help 
Cameroon address and reform the significant faults we found. Our report was 
frank and critical, but deliberately did not slam a door on our ability to move 
quickly to work with Cameroon on significant change. I was the chair of our 
team, but the late Samuel Kivuitu of Kenya was my de facto co-chair. He was 
an African statesman and was immensely respected by all our colleagues. 
Samuel ran into difficulty later because he was the chair of the Kenyan 
Electoral Commission that went wrong in 2007. And he bore – 
disproportionately, in my view – the blame for not having been as strong in a 
crunch as he should have been, and I think that’s what happened. But I think 
he was wise and invaluable in Cameroon.  
 
The third element of this experience was that there was not strong and timely 
follow-up on any of the changes we proposed. Part of that is just human 
nature. There is a focus on election observation during the election, but 
interest falls off afterwards. That is a recurring failing of election observation 
missions – by the Commonwealth and others. I was quite annoyed, and 
warned the Secretary General Don McKinnon that if the Commonwealth 
continued to do this, it would not attract the level of observers it needed. He 
agreed with that and, in time, a concrete Commonwealth-Cameroon proposal 
emerged that I would agree to co-chair with a senior Cameroonian minister to 
redesign their Elections Act. A contributing factor in my decision was the 
appointment by President Biya of a new senior minister, Philémon Yang, who 
had been Cameroonian ambassador then High Commissioner to Canada for 
16 years. I knew him, and knew he had influence on – and a long friendship 
with – President Biya. I had first met [Biya] in 1979 when, as Canadian Prime 
Minister, en route to the Lusaka CHOGM, I made an official visit to 
Cameroon. Mr Biya had been Prime Minister there at the time. We sought 
and received a clear commitment on the part of the President to meet me 
whenever I needed to meet him. The Commonwealth auspices were very 
good and respected, and the Commonwealth was flexible enough that our 
small team of experts and advisors included a number of African francophone 
members with experience with successful electoral changes elsewhere in 
Africa – which was important in Cameroon, with its deep francophone 
connection. And we were making good progress until we encountered 
recurring resistance from Cameroon to the idea of an independent and multi-
partisan Electoral Commission. I went into Yaounde on two separate visits to 
try to resolve this problem with the President, and he was mysteriously 
unavailable to meet me. I finally told the then-Prime Minister, I said, “I’m here 
for three more days and if I don’t meet the President I won’t be back.” And I 
didn’t meet the President and I didn’t go back.  
 
Now there was an additional and unrelated drama in that election, which in 
fact had a positive impact on the general practice and credibility of Election 
Observation Missions. An American group, quite atypically, sent in some 
former Congressmen as observers who arrived three days before the 
election, did not consult or travel extensively, and declared it a fair and free 
election…  
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SO:  Three days before? 
 
JC:  …and went home. It turned out that they had been funded by the public 
relations firm that was employed by the government of Cameroon in 
Washington. I also made a fuss about that and, to the credit, the organization 
of former Members of Congress has tightened their rules and practices about 
Election Observation. But, more importantly, there’s a formal international 
code now that deals with election monitoring – as a result of joint initiatives by 
the UN, the European Union, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) of the 
US, the Commonwealth and others – that has also set out some rules on [the] 
follow-up of election observations. I think that initiative was influenced by the 
Cameroon experience, but don’t believe it was instigated by the 
Commonwealth. However, the Commonwealth has been an active part of 
productive continuing discussions of election monitoring and reform that are 
occurring under the auspices of the EU, the Carter Center, UN and NDI. 
 
To return to our earlier discussion, what characterised the Commonwealth 
campaign against apartheid was a sense of a genuine Commonwealth 
mission, which generated an active partnership rooted in the concerns of 
several Heads of Government, stimulated by a skilled and activist Secretariat, 
and facilitated by the focus and co-ordination of the CCFMSA. The result was 
that – when something needed to be done to advance that Commonwealth 
mission – it got done. This was serious, consistent, and well-resourced 
initiative. I don’t know if that happens now. 
 
SO:  So what you’re suggesting, then, was a small, dynamic body, rather 
than a lumbering consortium of international inputs and actors? 
 
JC:  I also think that the Commonwealth is essentially – in the broadest sense of 
the word – a political instrument. It’s not a trade organisation and its defining 
purpose is not to deliver aid or services, however important they are. Its 
success was that it was able to mobilise political instincts and momentum 
around an important political issue. Now, are there any of those left which are 
susceptible to influence by the Commonwealth? To its great credit, the 
Commonwealth attaches a high priority to small states that have no other 
significant institutional defender. In considering the Commonwealth that could 
be, the question is: what are the significant political issues where the 
Commonwealth has the opportunity and the authority to make a difference? 
None would be in the league of apartheid. Some may have to do with respect 
of rights. The quality at the heart of the Commonwealth is an intrinsic respect 
for cultures, and reconciling cultural differences  
 
SO:  So you would argue that yes, the Commonwealth has been a useful 
body as a political instrument, but I know that – as far as Canada is 
concerned – it was eclipsed in the 1990s and 2000s for a variety of 
domestic political reasons. How far do you think its relevance is 
increasing now? 
 
JC:  There has been a change in the sources of conflict in the world. Serious 
conflict is now much more likely to be culturally-induced: different cultures, 
religions, identities. In the Cold War period, more conflict was induced – or 
controlled – by Superpowers or international alliances. Now, these cultural 
differences are more important, more inflammatory. I’m not here talking about 
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a clash of civilisations but instead that, as the world becomes more compact 
and connected, more people with different belief systems and values come 
together physically, or are more aware – and sometimes wary – of one 
another, and that can lead easily to hostility or suspicion. Increasingly, the 
news we see is violence rooted in, or aroused by, cultural resentment or fear 
or apprehension. The great advantage of the Commonwealth – on which the 
sun still never sets – is that it draws together all of these people, cultures, 
identities, and draws upon common interests more than antagonism. That is a 
simple institutional reality and asset. A small country today, looking for 
influence or help on an important issue to its success or survival would 
probably find more hope – and more capacity for genuine sympathy and 
action – in the Commonwealth than in the United Nations. Again, the 
Commonwealth is a family, not just an organization. And that distinction – that 
asset – could be augmented. Are there other areas for constructive action? 
Trade arrangements? Services and collaboration? Development assistance? 
No doubt. But they would flow from a sense of coming from a community that 
is deeper than economic, deeper than trade, broader than “today”, which is 
the distinguishing quality the Commonwealth represents. It is about belief 
systems and rights, about legal systems and the principles which engendered 
them; it is about a practical acceptance that differences and compromise are 
natural and valuable, and that the resolution of disagreements need not 
create a sense of victors and vanquished. It’s about equality, so the question 
of small states becomes relevant. Now, is this enough in the modern time? 
Certainly it is essential – arguably more essential now than in eras when 
conventional power or practice imposed a kind of order. The culture of 
respecting difference and pursuing common purposes is certainly relevant 
now. The Commonwealth is essentially a cultural emanation that draws 
support across cultural differences because it accepts them as valuable or 
inevitable. If it is true that the incendiary issues today are increasingly cultural, 
the Commonwealth capacity to respect and reconcile that diversity is as 
relevant today as ever, perhaps more so. So, how might we build upon this 
durable asset? 
 
SO:  If there’s a broader utility and value of the Commonwealth in terms of 
international discourse, international organisation – as you say, at that 
deeper level – to foster tolerance, to overcome international and 
individual group frictions…[then] how important is the Commonwealth 
to Canada? Has the Commonwealth caused Canada problems? Such as 
historic constitutional problems, or prime ministerial initiatives to 
modify that constitution of Canada in the 1980s? 
 
JC:  No I don’t think so at all. 
 
SO:  I’m just thinking about the issue of the Queen as head of the 
Commonwealth, or is that separate from the Queen as head of Canada? 
 
JC:  The Queen as head of Commonwealth should not be a problem. There is a 
separate issue as to whether she should also be designated, as she is now, 
as Queen of Canada. But even if that change came, it would not affect 
Canada’s commitment to the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  So, looking at Canada as an example of the constitutional discussions, 
constitutional internal debates/developments…What’s your view of 
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those, in your time in politics? When you came into politics, Trudeau 
was considering a significant modification of the constitution… 
 
JC:  Yes, but where Trudeau failed was in departing from the Canadian practice – 
almost the Canadian principle – of recognising the necessity to bring 
everyone in. I was Leader of the Opposition in that historic period, and I won’t 
reopen all of those debates but, with historic retrospect, his failure to find a 
way – his disinterest in finding a way – to bring Quebec into our reformed 
constitution in a way that Quebecers believe reflects their legitimate interests, 
is a major continuing problem in the country. I chaired a subsequent round of 
constitutional negotiations, leading to the Charlottetown Accord. What is 
remembered – and should be remembered in a democracy – is that this 
Charlottetown Accord was rejected by the Canadian people in a national 
referendum. But what is as significant is that we achieved a negotiated and 
unanimous agreement on a very wide range of difficult issues. That unanimity 
included the national government, the governments of all Canada’s provinces 
and both our then territories and, for the first time in our history, the four major 
groups representing Canada’s Aboriginal population – status Indians, Inuit, 
Métis, and off-reserve Aboriginals – each of whom was present and active at 
the negotiating table throughout all of the hearings and negotiations. They did 
not have a vote, because they were not formal governments under the 
constitution, but they were otherwise present and influential throughout, with 
the same de facto status as the formal governments of the federation. It was 
a complex agreement, involving difficult compromises by all parties, and failed 
in the referendum largely because different citizens and different interest 
groups had different reasons to oppose different elements of that 
compromise. That is an inherent challenge with referenda. That broad and 
patient negotiation – achieving unanimous agreement among elected leaders 
– proved that that the nation can work. That was based on a respect for 
legitimate differences, and that respect for difference is also a fundamental 
part of the Commonwealth tradition. So, in Canada’s case, the 
Commonwealth could reinforce some of the most necessary dynamics within 
our own country. The question for the Commonwealth is: can it become as 
unifying and constructive a force on contemporary issues as it did in the anti-
apartheid campaign, or as it probably did in the very early days of establishing 
an institution that would bring together countries [and] people with profound 
differences but common values and traditions, as it did when the 
Commonwealth was created in 1948? Can that recur? There’s not a clear 
answer to that, but there is a clear need, so finding that renewed purpose and 
relevance is possible enough that it should be tried. 
 
SO:  So, then, to conclude: you seem relatively optimistic about the survival 
of the Commonwealth. 
 
JC:  It has to prove its worth. I’m optimistic about its worth. I’m not necessarily 
optimistic about the political leadership that will cause the worth to be proven. 
It did, after all, take quite enormously talented people to come forward in the 
anti-apartheid period, whether they were Ted Scott or Sonny Ramphal or 
Emeka Anyaoku, or various elected leaders of Commonwealth countries. So 
the Commonwealth has that capacity to summon the best of the extraordinary 
range of talents of its members. 
 
SO:  That’s suggesting, then, that the Commonwealth through the Secretary 
General is best led by a politician rather than a civil servant – 
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notwithstanding Chief Emeka’s own strengths, and his enormous 
contribution dating back to 1966 when he was appointed to the 
Secretariat. Would you agree with that? 
 
JC:  I would. Is a chief a politician? In Emeka`s case, there was certainly evidence 
of real political talent and good political instincts. 
 
SO:  What was your view – as a veteran politician and leader – of McKinnon’s 
time in office there? 
 
JC:  He tried very sincerely to bring trade to the centre of the Commonwealth. 
Trade and finance. Those were issues he knew well, and they do represent 
real, common interests. But in my opinion, those are not the binding and 
defining qualities of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  No, from everything you’ve said, those are not the Commonwealth’s 
strengths. 
 
JC: Yes. But remember, the first Secretary General was a career diplomat – not a 
politician, albeit a man with significant political skills and insight. 
 
SO:  No, indeed. Although he had a very clear view of the political leverage 
and the political utility of the Secretariat. 
 
JC:  He did. 
 
SO:  Just to bring us right up to date… Canada, of course, has been 
remarkable in appointing a special envoy to Sri Lanka. The issue of 
human rights violations in Sri Lanka, and the choice of Colombo as the 
venue for the next CHOGM, is the topic, the challenge to the 
Commonwealth today. 
 
JC:  First, I don’t know enough about the reasons for that initiative; and, second, 
my prejudice and experience is that the Harper Conservatives are very 
selective on the rights they defend, and their motivation is often domestic. I 
would be immensely surprised if the Harper government would ever have 
introduced either Mr Diefenbaker’s Bill of Rights or Mr Trudeau’s Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. I led the Progressive Conservative Party – which the 
Harper party took over and absorbed in a merger – and know the fights I had 
internally to persuade some of my MPs to support the Charter of Rights in 
those intense parliamentary debates and votes in 1982. That was particularly 
the case with those members who came from the strain that drove the merger 
that formed the present Conservative party and government. They are 
defending some very particular rights – most prominently and unequivocally 
the right to exist of the State of Israel – and I have no doubt that that 
particular cause reflects a deep and genuine commitment on the part of some 
of their leadership. And they are very conscious of the partisan value of taking 
strong international positions which resonate with particular domestic 
populations. 
 
SO:  A realist view, rather than an idealist one?  
 
JC:  I’d say a domestic focus rather than an international one. 
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SO:  Sir, thank you very much indeed.  
 
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
